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To search for a target n-product Boolean vector of fixed weight d, we propose an important method involving the notion of a 
fixed-weight “vector label” accompanied with a vector label restoration algorithm. Based on these, we present a new quantum 
algorithm designed to search for a fixed-weight target whose computation complexity, specifically ( )1dnO C + , is better than that 
for a classical algorithm. Finally, we use the procedure to search for the NTRU private key as an example to verify the efficiency 
of the new algorithm in searching for fixed-weight target solutions. 
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Quantum computation evolved from proposals put forward 
by Paul [1] and Feynman [2] to harness the computational 
power of quantum environments. In 1992, Deutsch et al. [3] 
designed the first quantum algorithm whose computation 
capability surpassed that of an electronic computer. Shortly 
thereafter, Shor’s [4] quantum factorization algorithm and 
Grover’s [5] quantum search algorithm added further to the 
security difficulties associated with modern cryptology. 
Since then, to overcome this, scholars [6–9] in China and 
abroad have paid great attention to research into quantum 
computer technology, quantum computation algorithms and 
quantum cryptology. 
Grover’s algorithm, which offers an exhaustive search of 
long lists held in a quantum computer, reduces the compu-
tational complexity of current exhaustive search attacks 
from O(2n) to O(2n/2), thus raising the security concerns of 
current crypto-systems to a new level. Along with an 
in-depth study, Long et al. [10–13] presented an improved 
algorithm based on phase shifts with zero theoretical failure 
rate, while Zhong et al. [14] proposed a meet-in-the-middle 
quantum search algorithm. As a result, Grover’s algorithm  
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has been widely applied. 
Indeed, Grover’s algorithm is a universally applicable 
algorithm for which the input is an equally-weighted su-
perimposed state of all classical n-product states, each of 
which is potentially a target solution. However, in practical 
decryption of a cryptosystem, such problems can be repre-
sented as searches for a target solution with special conditions 
(as a target-product vector with fixed weight). If Grover’s 
algorithm is used to find a solution, then the computation 
complexity is no better than for classical search algorithms, 
sometimes even much worse. Reasoning in this way, the 
exploitation of a quantum computer’s powerful paralleling 
capability seems not to be fully achieved. Obviously, im-
proving the efficiency of classical crypto-analysis with the 
use of quantum computation principles is a key and vital 
problem needing to be resolved. In this article, we focus on 
solving this special crypto attack problem associated with 
target vectors of fixed weight, and we propose an important 
method introducing the notion of a fixed weight vector label 
and presenting a vector label restoration algorithm. Based 
on these, we give a new quantum algorithm for searching 
for a fixed-weight target vector that manifests a computa-
tion complexity notably better than classical algorithms. 
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The NTRU [15] public key cryptosystem, proposed by 
Jeffrey et al. In 1996, has now been adopted as one of the 
standard public key algorithms in IEEE P1363 and 
EESS(Consortium for Efficient Embedded Security). This 
algorithm, which is known for its fast implementation, high 
security and wide practical application, has received broad 
attention from experts and scholars around the world. At 
present, in classical cryptanalysis, there is no attack method 
effective against NTRU. In 2003, Ludwig [16] combined 
Grover’s algorithm with lattice reduction algorithm, and 
devised a quantum lattice reduction attack against NTRU. 
However, due to restrictions derived from the lattice reduc-
tion’s computation complexity, the computation complexity 
of NTRU’s quantum lattice reduction attack is not optimal. 
It is even no better than a NTRU force attack and 
meet-in-the-middle attack devised within a classical com-
putation environment, especially when the NTRU public 
key parameter N is relatively large. In essence, an attack 
involving a search of the NTRU private key can be thought 
of as a search for a target vector of fixed weight. In this ar-
ticle, a new quantum algorithm for such a search is intro-
duced and used in a NTRU force attack, meanwhile show-
ing that the computation complexity for private key 
searches can be reduced. 
1  Grover’s quantum search algorithm 
Grover’s quantum search algorithm is a method that con-
siders the problem of finding a solution x satisfying f(x)=a 
(a is a constant) in a large unsorted database. The algorithm 
that makes this tractable is described next. 
1.1  Algorithm description 
The algorithm needs two registers, the first has n qubits 
initialized in the product state 0
n⊗
, and the second has one 
qubit in the initial state 1 . 
(i) Produce the n qubits equal superposition state. The 
Hadamard transform is used to put the first register in the 
n-product state 0 n⊗  into the equally-weighted superposi-
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(ii) Oracle description. The search of a target solution in 
an unsorted database can be transformed into a determinant 
problem. Suppose we are supplied with a quantum oracle 
with the ability to recognize solutions to the search problem. 
In implementing the algorithm, the oracle computes the 
value of f(x) and compares that value with a given a, then 
obtains the result 
( ) ( )





f x if f x a
f x if f x a
⎧ = ≠⎪⎨ = =⎪⎩
 
More precisely, the oracle is a unitary operator, defined 
by its action on the computational basis, 
( ) ( )oracle 1 ,f xx xα⎯⎯⎯→ −  
where x  are an indexed registers. We say that the oracle 
marks the solutions to the search problem, by shifting the 
phase of the solution. 
(iii) Repeat the Grover iteration 2 4nπ  times. There 
are two operations performed in Grover iteration: 
a) Apply the oracle; 
b) Apply the unitary operator 2I Iϕ ϕ ϕ= −  on the 













The operator Iϕ amplifies here the amplitude of the solu-
tion, and the iterations must be performed π 2 4n  times 
so as to obtain a solution to the search problem with high 
probability. 
(iv) Measure the first register and return the target solu-
tion. 
1.2  Algorithm analysis 
The computational complexity of the Grover’s algorithm is 
O(2n/2), which is determined by the number of oracle calls 
used to perform the Grover iteration, and the algorithm 
succeeds with the probability O(1). 
2  Searching for a target solution with fixed  
weight 
Searching for a target solution with fixed weight is a search 
for all the inputs with weight of fixed value d. With classi-
cal search methods, a search is conducted of all n-product 
Boolean vectors with fixed weight d and then determining 
which satisfies the equation f(x)=a. Therefore, according to 
standard combinatorics, it can be easily calculated that the 
computation complexity for the above algorithm is 
( )dnO C . When using Grover’s algorithm, the computation 
complexity is O(2n/2). Obviously, when the value d is rela-
tively small, there is Cdn<2
n/2, that is, Grover’s algorithm is 
less effective than a classical search method. 
Despite this fact, Grover’s algorithm has been widely 
applied. Its input is the equally-weighted superposition state 
of all n-product vectors in the computational basis. The da-
tabase for the search is all the n-product vectors. However, 
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in the execution of the algorithm, it is impossible to distin-
guish the weight of vector as every vector could potentially 
be the target vector. Clearly though, when its weight is of 
fixed value d, those vectors of differing weights are defi-
nitely not target vectors. Under these circumstances, if using 
all n-product vectors in the input state, then the search do-
main will be enlarged, which means the information of the 
target vector with its fixed weight is not fully exploited. In 
contrast, with a classical search algorithm, the search scope 
is confined to a database of Cdn vectors since it is now possi-
ble to conduct the search on only fixed weight vectors. The 
different search domain sizes determine the differences in 
computation complexity. Therefore, it is not ideal or effec-
tive using directly Grover’s algorithm to conduct a search 
for a given fixed-weight target vector. 
3  Vector label with fixed weight and label res-
toration algorithm 
To improve the effectiveness of this quantum search algo-
rithm for a for a fixed-weight target vector, we do not need 
to conduct a search over all n-product Boolean vectors. In-
stead, we only need to search for all inputs of fixed weight 
d, which requires that the classical inputs with fixed weight 
d need to be represented as t-product vectors with (t < n). 
To achieve that, we introduce the definition of the t-product 
vector label of an n dimension vector with fixed weight d 
and with that, we propose a vector label restoration algo-
rithm. 
Definition 1: Suppose that the weight of an n-product 
Boolean vector v is d, and that in all positions v takes value 
0 except at positions i1, i2,…, id with 1≤i1<…<id≤n holding. 





v i i iI C C C= + + + +"  
We call the label of a target vector the “target label”. 
According to Definition 1, we can calculate the labels of 
all n-product vectors with fixed weight d, and the vectors 
and their labels are in one-to-one correspondence. To esti-
mate the required number of quantum bits and the range of 
search, the following lemma is given: 
Lemma 1. For all labels of n-product vectors with fixed 
weight d, the minimum and maximum values are 
1 2
1 2 1min 1 .
d d
v d dI C C C C += + + + + ="  
1 2
1 2 1max 1 .
d d
v n d n d n nI C C C C− + − + += + + + + ="  
Combinatorial, Lemma 1 can be easily proved, and based 
on this lemma, the maximum value of a label with fixed 
weight will decide the number of qubits required to conduct 
a label-specified search. Therefore, setting 
1min{ | 2 }.
d k
nt k C += ≤  
The number of qubits is then t. That is, the search domain 
size will be 2t, and that is much smaller than 2n which is the 
number when directly conducting a search over all n-product 
vectors. 
However, the result of a search over vector labels using 
Grover’s algorithm is that target label that corresponds to 
the fixed-weight target vector. Ultimately, we need to re-
cover the target vector from the target label. Moreover, in 
the process of searching the vector labels, they should be 
converted into corresponding n product vectors with fixed 
weight d as the label cannot be used in evaluation of the 
function f(x). For this purpose, we develop a fixed-weight 
vector label restoration algorithm (Algorithm S1). 
4  A quantum algorithm for searching a target 
solution with fixed weight 
In Grover’s quantum search algorithm, the Oracle is a sim-
ple judgment function, but when the weight of input vectors 
is fixed, then the Oracle is not as simple. In such cases, we 
need to conduct a search for vector labels and therefore, the 
concept of the Oracle in quantum search algorithms needs 
to be redefined. 
Suppose that the input of an Oracle is a t-product Boo-
lean vector b. We can then use the label restoration algo-
rithm to calculate n-product Boolean vector v corresponding 
to label b, determine the following equations: 
0 if ( ) ,
1 if ( ) .
b
b
F f v a
F f v a
= ≠⎧⎨ = =⎩
 
And present the Oracle’s output. Based on this Oracle, 
we propose a quantum algorithm (Algorithm S2) for 
searching a target solution with fixed weight. 
5  Quantum algorithm for searching NTRU’s  
private key 
To illustrate the problem of searching NTRU’s private key, 
we briefly introduce NTRU’s key generation and its rec-
ommended parameter settings; for more details see [15]. 
5.1  NTRU’s key generation and its recommended pa-
rameters 
In NTRU, there are three integer parameters (N,p,q) and 
four subsets LF, Lg, Lr, Lm of the polynomial ring 
R=Zq[X]/(X
N–1). Let ( )F FF L L d∈ =  denotes that there 
are dF coefficients in polynomial F is 1, the others are 0; 
similarly, for Lg=L(dg) and Lr=L(dr). The coefficients of 
plaintext polynomials mm L∈  are in the Boolean set {0,1}. 
To improve the security of NTRU cryptosystem, N is nec-
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essarily a prime, and gcd(p, q)=1, p<<q. 
The NTRU key generation: Randomly choose polynomi-
als F and g from the sets LF and Lg respectively, calculate 
f=1+pF which is invertible mod q, and let fq = f 
–1 mod q. If 
f is not invertible then choose another polynomial F in LF 
until a one is found. In fact, most polynomials meet the re-
quirement. Next, calculate h = fq * g (mod q). The polyno-
mials f and fq are NTRU’s private key (g should be kept also 
secret for security concerns) while h is its public key and 
(N, p, q) are public parameters. In 2005, new recommended 
parameters for NTRU implementations were proposed as 
shown in Table 1 (available at www.ntru.com). 
5.2  The present status of attacks against NTRU 
In classical attack research, Nick proposed a force attack 
against NTRU in 1998, and based on this, they devised a 
meet-in-the-middle (MITM) attack for which the computa-
tion complexity is much lower than that of force attack. 
However, a large quantity of storage space is required in 
instigating these MITM attacks. In 1997, through analysis 
of the relationship between NTRU’s public key and private 
key, Don et al. [17] proposed a lattice reduction attack  
against NTRU. Afterwards, Alexander (available at http:// 
citeseer.ist.psu.edu/article/may99cryptanalysis.html) improved 
on the lattice reduction attack by exploiting the special form 
of NTRU’s private key, and thus reducing its computation 
complexity. 
In quantum attack research, Ludwig proposed in 2003 a 
quantum lattice reduction algorithm based on the lattice 
reduction algorithm and Grover’s quantum search algo- 
rithm, which he used to attack the NTRU cryptosystem. 
Table 1  NTRU recommended parameters of 2005 
 N dF dg dr p q 
NTRU251 251 48 48 48 2 197 
NTRU347 347 66 66 66 2 269 
NTRU491 491 91 91 91 2 367 
NTRU587 587 108 108 108 2 439 
However, based on detailed analysis of NTRU’s lattice 
reduction algorithm, Nick presented in 2005 an estimation 
of a quantum lattice reduction attack’s theoretical and ex-
perimental computation complexity, and showed that the 
computation complexity of Ludwig’s method is still much 
larger than a MITM attack, even when the quantum lattice 
reduction attack is used. As is evident from Table 2, the 
MITM attack is the best of the attacks so far contrived 
against NTRU. 
5.3  Quantum algorithm for searching NTRU’s private 
key 
From the key generation of NTRU, the private key is gener- 
ated by f=1+pF, where F is a polynomial with fixed weight 
dF. Therefore, if we can find the polynomial F, we can de-
termine the private key f as p is public. Hence, searching for 
NTRU’s private key is basically the same as searching for a 
target solution with fixed weight, and then finding the pri-
vate key using Algorithm S2. Table 3 gives for this quan-
tum attack estimates of the computation complexity for dif-
ferent parameter values, when using Grover’s algorithm and 
target quantum search algorithm with fixed weight. 
Based on Table 3, the computation complexity for a 
quantum attack using Algorithm S2 is much lower than that 
for a classical force attack, and is a little higher than for a 
classical MITM attack against NTRU. However, a MITM 
attack requires a lot of storage space, and its storage com-
plexity is approximately ( )/ 2/ 2 ,dNO C  while the quantum 
search attack proposed in this article needs no storage space 
at all. Therefore, this new quantum attack against the NTRU 
crypto-system is even more efficient than the current best. 
6  Conclusions 
In this paper, a quantum algorithm for searching target solu-
tion with fixed weight was proposed that is more efficient 
Table 2  Computation complexity of known attacks against the NTRU crypto-system 
Attack methods Force attack 
Meet-in-the-middle 
attack 
Lattice reduction attack 
Quantum lattice 
reduction attack 
Computation complexity ( )dNO C  ( )/ 2/ 2dNO C N  ( )( )/ 43 / 6 kO n k  ( )( )/ 83 / 6 kO n k  
NTRU251 2172.7 280 2520 2260 
NTRU347 2239.4 2112 2797 2398.5 
NTRU491 2335.1 2160 2949 2474.5 
NTRU587 2399.7 2192 21581 2790.5 
Table 3  Quantum attack estimates 
NTRU parameters N, dF NTRU251 NTRU347 NTRU491 NTRU587 
Computation complexity ( )1dFNO C +  286.5 2119.8 2167.7 2200 
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than corresponding classical algorithms. Its computation 
complexity is notably reduced, especially when the fixed 
weight of the target solution is relatively small. The effi-
ciency of the new algorithm has also been demonstrated in 
an example by using it in searching NTRU’s private key as 
part of a quantum attack against this cryptosystem. 
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Algorithm1 (fixed-weight vector recovery algorithm) 
Input: integer 0 2 1tb≤ ≤ − , integers n and d;  
Output: n-product Boolean vector v; 
1: let vI b= , if 1 1d dd v nC I C+ +≤ ≤  then go to Step 2; otherwise v=0; 
2: let k=0, i1=i2=…=id=0; 
3: for j=0 to n–1 
4: if k<d and n–j≥d–k 




7: d kv v n jI I C
−
−= − ; 
8: k=k+1; 





v v v= = = =" ; 
11: output n-product Boolean vector v0. 
Algorithm analysis: 
Not all the t-product Boolean vectors are the desired labels. Specifically, if the input integer of Algorithm1 is the label of 
an n-product Boolean vector with fixed weight d, then the output is an n-product Boolean vector; otherwise the output is the 
null vector. 
The key behind the execution of Algorithm1 occurs in the iterative loop from Step 3 to Step 8. This loop needs to be re-
peated at most n times, thus the computation complexity of Algorithm1 is O(n). Thus, it is relatively easy to recover the 
n-product Boolean vector with fixed weight d if its label is known. 
Algorithm2 (Quantum algorithm for searching a target solution with fixed weight) 
Input: function f, constant a , dimension n and weight d ; 
Output: solution x satisfied f(x)=a ; 
1: Calculate the maximum value of the labels 1
d
nC + ; let 1min{ | 2 }
d k
nt k C += ≤ ; 
2: Use Grover’s algorithm to search for t -product Boolean vectors, and get its output b0; 
3: Use the label restoration algorithm to calculate the n-product Boolean vector v0 corresponding to label b0; 
4: let x=v0; 
5: output target solution x. 
Algorithm analysis: 
According to the above procedure, there is no necessary store in Algorithm2, and the rate of success is 1. The following 
will focus on the computation complexity of Algorithm2. 
The essential stage is Step2, which is, using the quantum search algorithm to search for a t-product Boolean vector. Hence, 
as the calculations in all other steps proceed in polynomial time, the computation complexity of Algorithm2 is O(2t/2). Be-
cause }2|min{ 1
kd
nCkt ≤= + , its computation complexity can be given as approximately ( )1dnO C + .  
According to Table 1, the computation complexity in searching for a target solution with fixed weight is much lower for a 
quantum algorithm than for a classical one. For the rest of this article, we discuss the NTRU’s private key searching problem 
as an example to further explain the important practical role that quantum search algorithms have in crypto-analysis. 
Table 1  Computation complexity of different algorithms  
Search algorithm Classical algorithm Quantum algorithm 
Computation complexity ( )dnO C  ( )1dnO C +  
 
